**EXPLANATORY STATEMENT**

Issued by the Minister for Home Affairs

*Criminal Code Act 1995*

*Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation–Terrorgram) Regulations 2025*

The purpose of the *Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation–Terrorgram) Regulations 2025* (the Regulations) is to specify the organisation known as Terrorgram for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of ***terrorist organisation*** in subsection 102.1(1) of the *Criminal Code.*

Section 5 of the *Criminal Code* *Act 1995* provides that the Governor-General may make regulations prescribing matters required or permitted by the Act to be prescribed, or necessary or convenient to be prescribed, for carrying out or giving effect to that Act.

Paragraph (b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in subsection 102.1(1) of the *Criminal Code* provides that regulations can specify organisations for the purposes of the definition of terrorist organisation.

Subsection 102.1(2) of the *Criminal Code* provides that before the Governor-General makes regulations specifying an organisation for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in subsection 102.1(1), the ***AFP Minister*** (the Minister for Home Affairs) must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, or advocates the doing of a terrorist act. Subsection 100.1(1) provides that, for Part 5.3 of the *Criminal Code*, the AFP Minister is the Minister administering the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979*.

The AFP Minister is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation, Terrorgram, is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act or advocates the doing of a terrorist act. In coming to this position, the AFP Minister has taken into consideration unclassified information provided by the relevant agencies (the Statement of Reasons at Attachment C).

*Effect of the instrument*

Division 102 of Part 5.3 of the *Criminal Code* sets out the following offences relating to terrorist organisations:

* directing the activities of a terrorist organisation;
* being a member of a terrorist organisation;
* recruiting persons for a terrorist organisation;
* receiving training from, providing training to or participating in training with a terrorist organisation;
* getting funds to, from or for a terrorist organisation;
* providing support to a terrorist organisation; and
* associating with a terrorist organisation.

The Regulations enable Terrorgram to be recognised as a terrorist organisation for the purposes of the offence provisions in Division 102 of Part 5.3 of the *Criminal Code*.

The Regulations are a legislative instrument for the purposes of the *Legislation Act 2003*.

The Regulations commence on the day after they are registered on the Federal Register of Legislation.

A Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights has been completed in accordance with the *Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011*. The overall assessment is that the Regulations are compatible with human rights. A copy of this Statement is at Attachment A.

Further details of the Regulations are set out in Attachment B.

*Consultation*

The *Intergovernmental Agreement on Counter-Terrorism Laws* (IGA) requires that the Commonwealth Government consult with the governments of the States and Territories prior to making regulations specifying an organisation for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in subsection 102.1(1) of the *Criminal Code*. The IGA provides that if a majority of States and Territories object to the making of such a regulation within a timeframe nominated by the Commonwealth, and provide reasons for their objections, the Commonwealth will not make the regulation at that time.

The former AFP Minister, the Attorney-General, wrote to the Premiers and Chief Ministers of the States and Territories. A majority of States and Territories did not object to the making of the Regulations within the timeframe nominated by the Attorney‑General. Noting this engagement, there is no additional requirement for the current AFP Minister, being the Minister for Home Affairs, to write again to the jurisdictions.

Subsection 102.1(2A) of the *Criminal Code* provides that before the Governor-General makes a regulation specifying an organisation for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of ***terrorist organisation*** in subsection 102.1(1) of the *Criminal Code*, the ***AFP Minister*** must arrange for the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives to be briefed in relation to the proposed regulation. The Minister for Home Affairs wrote to the Leader of the Opposition, enclosing the information upon which he was satisfied that Terrorgram meets the legislative requirements for listing.

**ATTACHMENT A**

**Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights**

*Prepared in accordance with Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011*

**Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation***–***Terrorgram) Regulations 2025**

This Disallowable Instrument is compatible with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the *Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.*

**Overview of the Disallowable Legislative Instrument**

The *Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation–Terrorgram) Regulations 2025*(the Regulations) specify Terrorgram for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in subsection 102.1(1) of the Schedule to the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (the *Criminal Code*)*.*

The object of the Regulations is to identify that Terrorgram is a terrorist organisation under Australian law, and put the organisation and members of the public on notice of that fact.  Notification is important to help people avoid engaging in activities which might constitute an offence under Division 102 of the Criminal Code in relation to Terrorgram.

The Regulations, which are part of Australia’s terrorist organisation listing regime, support the application of the offences in Division 102 of the Criminal Code, the object of which is to protect national security, public safety and the rights and freedoms of persons within and outside of Australia. Division 102 offences criminalise conduct including being a member of, associating with, directing the activities of, recruiting for, funding, providing support to, and training with a terrorist organisation.

Terrorist organisations present a threat to the security of Australia and often seek to harm Australians and our democratic institutions.  The statutory definition of a terrorist organisation requires that an organisation directly or indirectly engages in, prepares, plans, assists in or fosters the doing of a terrorist act or, in relation to a listed terrorist organisation, that the organisation advocates the doing of a terrorist act.

**Human rights implications**

The Regulations promote the following human rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):

         the inherent right to life in Article 6.

The Regulations limit the following human rights contained in the ICCPR:

         the right to freedom of expression in Article 19, and

         the right to freedom of association in Article 22.

***The inherent right to life in Article 6***

Article 6 of the ICCPR provides that countries have a duty to take appropriate steps to protect the inherent right to life by law. The Regulations, and the terrorist organisation listing regime more broadly, ensure that the offence provisions in Division 102 of the Criminal Code apply to certain conduct in relation to listed terrorist organisations.  These offence provisions operate to penalise conduct that presents a significant risk to life, both in Australia and overseas, and, in conjunction with the terrorist organisation listing regime, also act as a deterrent to that conduct.  Deterring the conduct, and thereby preventing the risk to life, promotes the inherent right to life expressed in Article 6 of the ICCPR.

***The right to freedom of expression in Article 19***

Article 19(2) of the ICCPR provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression.  However, Article 19(3) provides that freedom of expression may be limited if it is necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose, including for the protection of national security.  The Regulations, and the terrorist organisation listing regime more broadly, limit the right to freedom of expression to the extent that persons are prohibited from directing the activities of, recruiting for, providing support to or associating with terrorist organisations, including Terrorgram.  The restrictions on freedom of expression are justified on the basis that such conduct could jeopardise the security of Australia, the personal safety of its population, its national interests, and the public order. Any restrictions are reasonable, necessary and proportionate to the objective of protecting Australia’s national security.

***The right to freedom of association in Article 22***

Article 22 of the ICCPR protects the right of all persons to group together voluntarily for a common goal and to form and join an organisation.  Article 22(2) provides that this right may be limited for the purpose of national security.  The Regulations, and the terrorist organisation listing regime more broadly, limit the right of freedom of association to prevent people engaging with and participating in terrorist organisations, in this instance Terrorgram.

The offence of associating with a terrorist organisation in section 102.8 of the Criminal Code is limited in its application to an organisation that is a listed terrorist organisation under the definition of ***terrorist organisation*** in paragraph 102.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.  The offence does not apply if the association is with a close family member and relates to a matter of family or domestic concern, or takes place in the course of practicing a religion in a place used for public religious worship, or the association is only for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid or only for the purpose of providing legal advice or legal representation. Given the exemptions, the Regulations are not considered to limit the right to freedom of religion.

Due to the severity of the danger posed by terrorist organisations, it is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to limit the right of individuals who, by their association with a terrorist organisation, pose a threat to Australians.

***General safeguards and accountability mechanisms***

Whilst the Regulations may limit the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of association with Terrorgram, the Regulations are subject to the safeguards outlined below. The limits on these rights are reasonable, necessary and proportionate, and are in the interests of public safety and national security, after taking into consideration the direct and indirect terrorist activities of the organisation, which threaten human life.

The Criminal Code provides safeguards and accountability mechanisms requiring prior consultation and enabling review of the Regulations, including the following:

* the Commonwealth must consult with the states and territories in accordance with the Intergovernmental Agreement on Counter‑Terrorism Laws of 25 June 2004, and the Regulations may only be made if a majority of the states and territories do not object to the Regulations within a reasonable time specified by the Commonwealth;
* under subsection 102.1(2A) of the Criminal Code the Minister must arrange for the Leader of the Opposition to be briefed in relation to the proposed Regulations;
* subsection 102.1(4) of the Criminal Code provides that if the Minister ceases to be satisfied of the criteria necessary for listing an organisation under subsection 102.1(2) of the Criminal Code, the Minister must make a declaration to that effect by written notice published in the Gazette, with the effect of the Minister’s declaration being that the Regulations listing the organisation cease to have effect and the organisation is de-listed as a terrorist organisation under Division 102 of the Criminal Code;
* subsection 102.1(17) of the Criminal Code provides that an individual or an organisation may make a de‑listing application to the Minister, and the Minister must consider these applications as soon as is practicable, unless a request in relation to the same organisation has been made in the past 12 months;
* the Regulations may be reviewed at any time by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security under section 102.1A of the Criminal Code; and
* both Houses of Parliament may disallow the Regulations within 15 sitting days after the Regulations are laid before that House, as provided for in section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003 and noting that this period may be extended by operation of subsection 102.1A(4) of the Criminal Code if the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security reviews the Regulations.

**Conclusion**

The Regulations are compatible with human rights because they promote the protection of human rights.  To the extent that the terrorist organisation listing regime, of which the Regulations are part, may also limit human rights, those limitations are for a legitimate purpose and are reasonable, necessary and proportionate.

**The Hon Tony Burke MP**

**Minister for Home Affairs**

**ATTACHMENT B**

**Details of the proposed *Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation–Terrorgram) Regulations 2025***

Section 1 - Name

This section provides that the title of the Regulations is the *Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation‑ Terrorgram) Regulations 2025.*

Section 2 - Commencement

This section provides for the Regulations to commence the day following registration.

Section 3 - Authority

This section provides that the proposed Regulationsare made under the *Criminal Code Act 1995*.

Section 4 – Terrorist organisation *–* Terrorgram

Subsection 4(1) provides that, for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of ***terrorist organisation*** in subsection 102.1(1) of the *Criminal Code,* the organisation known as Terrorgram is specified.

The effect of specifying Terrorgram as a terrorist organisation is to ensure that offences in Subdivision B of Division 102 of the *Criminal Code* that relate to terrorist organisations are able to operate, where the appropriate elements are satisfied, in relation to conduct in connection with Terrorgram.

Subsection 4(2) provides that Terrorgram is also known as ‘The Terrorgram Collective’.

**ATTACHMENT C**

**Statement of Reasons – Terrorgram**

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| **Listing Terrorgram as a terrorist organisation under Division 102 of the *Criminal Code*** |
| This Statement of Reasons is based on publicly available information about Terrorgram. To the Australian Government’s knowledge, this information is accurate, reliable and has been corroborated by classified information where available. |
| **Summary**  Terrorgram is a Nationalist and Racist Violent Extremist (NRVE) organisation comprising a group of persons who use a network of various online channels, based primarily on the online messaging application Telegram. Terrorgram is an organisation consisting of leaders and members that creates and distributes propaganda with the intent to inspire terrorist attacks on minority groups, critical infrastructure and specific individuals they deem against their values. The organisation advocates for and provides instructions on how to conduct a terrorist attack, and has successfully inspired a number of terrorist attacks in the United States (US), Europe and Asia. The decentralised and encrypted online environment of Terrorgram allows the organisation to operate internationally with few barriers, and with membership relatively easily attainable for Australians. A key concern is Terrorgram’s frequent promotion and praise of the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack and perpetrator, which it uses as a propaganda tool to radicalise potential members, advocate terrorist actions, and spread its NRVE ideology. |
| **Name of the organisation**  Terrorgram.  **Known aliases**  The Terrorgram Collective. |
| **Legislative basis for listing a terrorist organisation**  Division 102 of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Criminal Code) provides that for an organisation to be listed as a terrorist organisation, the AFP Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation:   1. is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act; or 2. advocates the doing of a terrorist act.   For the purposes of listing a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code, subsection 102.1(20) of the Criminal Code describes the doing of a terrorist act as including the doing of a specific terrorist act, the doing of more than one terrorist act and the doing of a terrorist act, even if a terrorist act does not occur. |
| **Background to this listing**  Terrorgram has not previously been listed as a terrorist organisation.  On 3 February 2025, the Australian Government listed Terrorgram for counter-terrorism financing sanctions under Part 4 of the *Charter of the United Nations Act 1945*, which gives effect to Australia’s international obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. |
| **Details of the organisation**  Terrorgram is a NRVE and accelerationist organisation active primarily on the online messaging platform, Telegram. Terrorgram is a decentralised organisation comprising a group of persons who use various online network of channels and chats in which users advocate the use of violence to initiate a ‘race war’ to establish a white ethno-state. Accelerationism is an ideology that believes that coordinated violence is necessary to ‘accelerate’ the collapse of the government and modern society to prevent ‘white genocide’, and is heavily aligned with various neo-Nazi ideological concepts. Terrorgram additionally advocates for anti-LGBTQ+ violence.  Terrorgram has its roots in the Iron March forum, a neo-Nazi web forum that operated from 2011 to 2017. Iron March users were involved in the creation of groups such as the National Socialist Order (aka Atomwaffen Division or AWD, listed as a terrorist organisation in Australia under the Criminal Code on 12 August 2021) and Sonnenkrieg Division, (listed on 18 February 2022) among others. Both the aforementioned entities have been subject to counter-terrorism financing sanctions since 18 May 2022. Following the closure of Iron March forum in 2017, Terrorgram evolved to become a more prominent and distinct organisation in the far-right neo-Nazi online environment.  Terrorgram focusses heavily on the creation and dissemination of propaganda designed to further its accelerationist ideology, encouraging its members to commit acts of terrorism and violence. Such propaganda includes memes, neo-Nazi cultural references, sharing of previous NRVE offenders’ manifestos, and polished graphic design motifs in its publications. A defining feature of the organisation is their ‘sanctification’ of accelerationist and white supremacist attackers, which venerates previous NRVE offenders, including the 2019 Christchurch shooter, with the aim of inspiring Terrorgram members to commit similar terrorist acts. |
| **Leadership**  The administrators and members within Terrorgram intentionally leverage the encrypted nature of Telegram to obscure their identities. Users employ different aliases and usernames as part of a deliberate tactic to maintain anonymity and thwart law enforcement efforts to identify users.  Terrorgram has a diffused leadership structure. Rather than directly facilitating attacks, leaders often take on the role of administrators, aiming to create and disseminate key propaganda documents of the organisation, and administer channels and group chats where online activities take place. Terrorgram administrators and members promote lone-actor attacks, and take inspiration from a variety of NRVE ideologies. Individuals are encouraged to plan and fund their attacks themselves.  When a previous leader was arrested in the US on charges related to terrorism, they were replaced by new identified leaders (Matthew Allison and Dallas Humber). This new leadership ran Terrorgram channels, group chats, contributed to and disseminated Terrorgram videos and publication, solicited users to commit bias-motivated attacks, provided guidance and instructions to users to carry out attacks, and inspired users to become ‘Saints’ by committing attacks to further white supremacist accelerationism.  There is significant overlap between members involved with Terrorgram and other NRVE organisations active on the Telegram platform, including the National Socialist Order and the Base, both of which are currently listed as terrorist organisations in Australia. Members of these in-person groups often obtain or share propaganda from Terrorgram and Telegram channels.  *Notable Terrorgram leaders:*   * Ciro Daniel Amorim Ferreira, Noah Licul and Hendrik-Wahl Muller – Terrorgram channel administrators and senior members of Terrorgram, who are nationals of Brazil, Croatia and South Africa respectively. On 13 January 2025, the US designated Ferreira, Licul and Muller as Specially Designated Global Terrorists on the basis they are key influencers of Terrorgram. * Dallas Erin Humber – The US Department of Justice alleges that Humber was one of the two leaders of Terrorgram and has been active in the organisation since 2019 and a leader since 2022. Humber narrated the prominent Terrorgram propaganda video White Terror as well as narrating several ‘audiobook’ versions of manifestos written by far-right extremist attackers. Also known as the ‘MG’ and ‘RWBC’ (Right-Wing Book Club) two aliases which are credited with authoring several sections in key Terrorgram publications. Humber was arrested and charged in September 2024 for soliciting hate crimes, soliciting the murder of federal officials and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists. * Matthew Allison – A member of Terrorgram since 2019, and second leader since 2022, Allison was arrested and charged alongside Dallas Humber for his role in the leadership of Terrorgram. Allison was alleged to have contributed to and disseminated several of the Terrorgram’s key propaganda documents, including videos and publications that provide advice for carrying out crimes, celebrate white supremacist attacks and provide a hit list of “high-value targets” for assassination. In addition, Allison is alleged to be engaged in directly soliciting individuals to commit terror attacks to further Terrorgram’s accelerationist and NRVE ideology. * Pavol Beňadik aka Slovakbro – An influential member of Terrorgram. Beňadik routinely posted accelerationist content inciting violence against individuals, government buildings, and infrastructure, and wrote a manifesto in 2022, announcing his intention to join the Ukraine conflict to incite violence and chaos. Beňadik’s manifesto specifically named Terrorgram and what it can do to destabilise the conflict. Beňadik was arrested in May 2022 and convicted in November, by a joint operation of American, Slovakian and Czech authorities, for distributing hate speech and 3D printed weapons manuals. The manifesto of the attacker responsible for the 2022 terrorist attack on a LGBTQI+ bar in Bratislava, Slovakia, killing two and injuring another, specifically named Beňadik as an inspiration and thanked Terrorgram and praised members for their “wonderful texts, art, and for practical guides.” * Matthew Althorpe – Created propaganda and instructions on how to conduct a terrorist offence for both Terrorgram and the National Socialist Order, and was subsequently arrested by Canadian authorities. Althorpe is facing multiple charges including instructing a person to carry out terrorist activity and counselling the commission of a terrorism offence. * Patrick Gordon MacDonald aka Dark Foreigner – Designed the initial propaganda style of Terrorgram. A 26-year-old graphic designer from Canada, MacDonald was arrested and charged with terrorism and hate propaganda charges for his involvement in creating propaganda material for a range of NRVE groups including Terrorgram, National Socialist Order, and the Base. * Brandon Russell – Founder of National Socialist Order. Russell was arrested in 2017 for unlawful possession and storage of explosives. Following his release, Russell was again arrested on 3 February 2023, along with his partner Sarah Beth Clendaniel, for conspiring to destroy a US energy facility. A video tribute of Russell and Clendaniel was circulated on at least seven neo-Nazi Telegram channels including a caption stating, “Tribute to Terrorgram's Hottest Power Couple”. Russell was in contact with Dallas Erin Humber and Matthew Allison and assisted them in distributing the propaganda document ”The Hard Reset” (Hard Reset) from 2022 onwards. At Russell’s trial evidence was presented that he conspired to carry out attacks against critical infrastructure to further his racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist beliefs. Russell posted links to open-source maps of infrastructure, which included the locations of electrical substations, and he described how a small number of attacks on substations could cause a “cascading failure.” On 4 February 2025, a jury found Russell guilty of conspiracy to damage an energy facility, facing a maximum penalty of 20 years in federal prison and will be sentenced on 17 June 2025. |
| **Recruitment & Membership**  *Recruitment*  Terrorgram utilises a vetting process prior to allowing user access to closed Terrorgram channels. Following some Terrorgram member’s identities being revealed in recent US terrorist listings, as well as the arrest of members of The Base, National Socialist Order and other extremist far right‑wing groups, the scope of this vetting process has possibly been expanded to further protect members.  Due to its online, decentralised, and geographically dispersed nature, the barriers to entry for prospective members are low in comparison to other terrorist or violent extremist organisations. There is no need for members to be co‑located, and the risks of attracting the attention of law enforcement associated with joining encrypted channels and group chats is perceived to be lower than for other NRVE and accelerationist groups.  Terrorgram vets users prior to admittance to its more extreme and illicit channels and chat groups, and actively recruits in the ‘acceptable fringe’ of online right-wing spaces. Members of Terrorgram intentionally join mainstream channels in the hopes of radicalising them. An example of this is the discovery of three far-right channels with over 70,000 subscriptions being linked to Terrorgram and Terrorgram users present in all three channels, as well as a common bot account across the channels. The channels were also connected to group chats which contained copies of Terrorgram propaganda documents.  *Membership*  As Terrorgram exists primarily through various encrypted online communication channels, the scale and total number of members is difficult to quantify. Additionally, there is difficulty in differentiating between users or viewers of Terrorgram content and active members or creators. Membership of Terrorgram is not restricted by geographic location, with members of the organisation comprising an international cohort, possibly including Australians. Terrorgram is currently prioritising the recruitment of propagandists, hackers, and graphic designers to ensure continuation of its extremist visual content mandate. Content advising on committing terrorist attacks receives high levels of engagement, with a now deleted channel primarily used to broadcast bomb-making tutorials receiving over 2000 views on each post. |
| **Funding & Resources**  Terrorgram does not require significant resources or funding to operate due to its focus on encrypted online activities and propaganda dissemination. Activities are likely largely self-funded by members due to its decentralised structure. Terrorgram publications emphasise the need for members to self-fund attacks, and provides step-by-step instructions and manuals for inexpensive methods to enact violence, such as knife, gun, or deliberate vehicle-ramming into crowds of people at events or sites.  In April 2024, Telegram added a feature for channel administrators to earn revenue by allowing advertising on their channels. This may be an additional funding source for Terrorgram administrators. |
| **Links to other groups**  Terrorgram acts as a focal point for the accelerationist-aligned NRVE community on Telegram, and provides links and connections to more regional or issue specific NRVE groups. Many individuals involved with other accelerationist or NRVE groups regularly interact with Terrorgram content and propaganda.  Terrorgram propaganda is widely shared across various neo-Nazi and accelerationist aligned groups, channels, and group chats and is used as tools for recruitment and ideology promotion by these groups.  The following listed terrorist organisations have confirmed links to Terrorgram:   * The Base; * National Socialist Order (AKA Atomwaffen Division) ; * Sonnenkrieg Division. |
| **Terrorist activity**  Terrorgram creates terrorist propaganda content and encourages its members to commit lone-actor, low cost attacks. Terrorgram propaganda includes detailed information on how to successfully carry out attacks and provides a list of suggested targets which are regularly updated and disseminated via Terrorgram-associated channels. These lists include minority groups and targets of societal significance, such as high office holders and critical infrastructure. Terrorgram’s veneration of the ‘Saints’ culture[[1]](#footnote-2) and praise of terrorist acts motivated by NRVE and accelerationist ideology, may have influenced, inspired or could inspire future terrorist acts, perpetrated by either Terrorgram members or individuals who are exposed to Terrorgram-produced content.  **Advocates the doing of a terrorist act**  Terrorgram is focused on the creation and distribution of propaganda that praises, encourages, counsels and instructs terrorist acts. The organisation has released several branded publications and propaganda videos to this effect. Significant resources of the organisation are devoted to crafting a specific brand in these publications, with the use of modern graphic design methods intended to appeal to young online audiences.  Terrorgram uses manifestos to inspire individuals to commit terror attacks, an important part of the ‘Saints’ propaganda system. Members are encouraged to leave a manifesto before committing a terrorist act, detailing their motivations and rationale. Terrorgram encourages others to commit terrorist offences to achieve 'Saint' status, by facilitating the spread of manifestos and immortalising perpetrators of terrorist attacks.  Additionally, Terrorgram has created and disseminated detailed guidelines and instructions on how to most effectively commit a lone-actor violent attack. These guides encourage users to follow these guidelines to complete a successful attack that will advance their cause, without being caught in the planning or initial stages.  Examples of Terrorgram advocacy include:   * 26 June 2024 – A 19-year-old Australian man attempted to livestream a terrorist attack targeting politician Tim Crakanthorp in Newcastle, New South Wales. The attack failed, but the individual uploaded a 205-page manifesto, which cites the 2019 Christchurch shooter (proclaimed a ‘Saint’ by Terrorgram) as inspiration and claims Telegram played a critical role in his radicalisation. Since this attack, the individual has been charged with one count of ‘attempting to commit a terrorist act’. Following the failure of the attack, Terrorgram members posted advice and instructions for how prospective future attackers could avoid the same failures and succeed in carrying out lone actor terrorist attacks. The users explicitly advocated for individuals to carry out more successful attacks through the provision of this advice. * 14 October 2022 – Terrorgram published a propaganda video titled ‘White Terror’, a documentary style video listing and celebrating all of the individuals involved in right-wing terrorist attacks that Terrorgram considers to be ‘Saints’. The purpose of the video was to praise these terrorist attacks with the intent to encourage individuals to engage in future terrorist acts. The video was narrated by ‘RWBC’ AKA Dallas Erin Humber (one of Terrorgram’s leaders at the time), and was dedicated to the shooter, who two days earlier, had attacked and killed two at an LGBTQI+ bar in Bratislava, Slovakia. * 14 July 2022 –Terrorgram published Hard Reset, a 256-page digital magazine, ‘zine’, that glorifies violence, explicitly encourages lone-actor terrorist acts and provides detailed instructions for carrying out various forms of terrorist attacks and civil disobedience designed to target minority groups and targets of societal significance, including government buildings and public infrastructure. Hard Reset is split across seven chapters written by 24 separate authors. Of the total 256 pages, 47 promote attacks on infrastructure and 27 promote criminal acts or acts of terrorism. * October 2021 to Present – Terrorgram have published “The List” encouraging action against targets they deem as against their values. The List is a hit list of ‘high-value’ targets for assassination or other forms of offences. Terrorgram has created graphics called List cards for each target, which include the name, home address, photograph and a photograph of the target’s residence encouraging members to commit accelerationist or NRVE inspired attacks against identified targets in their area. The List has been updated from its inception in October 2021. The US indictment of Humber and Allison cited List cards of targets posted on the channel in 2022.   **Other related activity**  The following are examples of other related activities by individuals who may have been inspired by Terrorgram or the actions of Terrorgram members.   * 11 July 2024 – An 18-year-old New Jersey man was arrested and charged with soliciting destruction of US energy facilities in a plot linked to Terrorgram. The individual allegedly sent an undercover agent materials circulated on Terrorgram, intended to help them carry out the operation. He specifically sent a PDF version of Hard Reset, and claimed to have taken a role in the publication of the work and described it as ‘the perfect starting guide’. * 26 August 2023 – A Terrorgram inspired individual shot and killed three people in Jacksonville, Florida. The shooter was proclaimed a ‘Saint’ by Terrorgram and left a manifesto, which listed the 2019 Christchurch attacker as their main inspiration. After the attack, Terrorgram circulated photos of the individual and their weaponry on its channels. * 6 February 2023 – A man and a woman were charged with conspiring to destroy energy facilities for their plans to attack electrical substations and power grid facilities in Maryland, United States. The couple were motivated by their accelerationist beliefs and were in communication with Allison and Humber (Terrorgram leaders at the time) and assisted them in distributing Hard Reset. Investigations by the Southern Poverty Law Centre’s Hatewatch into the actions of the individuals, revealed that the plot they were found guilty of attempting to execute included the instructions from Terrorgram publications, including the publication “Make it Count: A Guide for the 21st Century Accelerationist”, which exhort white-power accelerationists to target infrastructure. It also contains violent incitements of law enforcement officials, politicians, civilians, public events, abortion clinics and providers, people of colour, immigrants, and the LGBTQ populace. * 12 October 2022 – A 19-year-old Slovakian man attacked a LGBTQI+ bar in Bratislava, Slovakia, killing two and injuring another. The attackers manifesto directly referenced Terrorgram as well as referring to the ‘Saints’ culture, and Terrorgram publications, including Hard Reset, as inspiration for his attack. This marked the first time that Terrorgram was explicitly referenced in a terrorist’s manifesto. Academic analysis of the attacker’s manifesto has raised suggestions that his actions were directed, at least in part, by a US based member of Terrorgram in a ‘command and control’ role from May 2022 onwards.   The following is an example of other related Terrorgram materials:   * 14 April 2024 – In a Terrorgram group chat with former leaders Allison and Humber, the chat administrator posted “The BTC Movie Trilogy”, a compilation of accelerationist propaganda videos created by Allison. The chat/channel is dedicated to compiling and reposting content from a defunct channel ‘Ban this Channel’ (BTC), and the compilation contains "all 40...episodes" of BTC’s “Devived” project. The reposted compilation includes propaganda videos such as ‘How to Get Radicalized’, ‘UnBanned’, ‘White Revolution’ which shows a montage of militant training and political violence, and ‘Set the World on Fire’ which shows a montage of arsonist attacks and clashes between civilians and riot police. The channel compiling and promoting BTC’s content urged viewers to “remember...these videos are not for entertainment purposes only” and to “take action now.”   *Terrorgram context – ‘Saints’ propaganda system*  Terrorgram engages in a system of propaganda showcasing individuals who carry out acts of terrorism as a ‘Saint’, as a means of encouraging members to carry out attacks in their own locations. The organisation’s veneration of these individuals’ actions and motivations is intended to directly promote, encourage and counsel the doing of terror attacks by their members. To be sanctified by Terrorgram an attacker must fulfil a number of standards set by Terrorgram administrators, including publishing a manifesto and achieving at least one kill. In addition, a culture of aiming to achieve a high kill count or ‘high score’ has arisen in certain Terrorgram channels. This veneration helps Terrorgram glorify mass violence in an effort to inspire others.  Terrorgram continue to utilise the events of the 2019 Christchurch attack and the offender’s manifesto to amplify the organisation’s ideology, inciting subsequent attacks and manifestos. As demonstrated by the number of attacks that have attributed their inspiration to key figures in Terrorgram ‘pantheon’ of ‘Saints’, this method is a highly effective technique. Attacks used by the organisation in the development of sanctification propaganda include the below:   * 15 March 2019 – An Australian national shot and killed 51 people and wounded another 40 at the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand. The individual produced and disseminated a manifesto in which he espoused white nationalism and white supremacist beliefs in addition to accelerationist ideology. The shooter also livestreamed his attack, significantly increasing his notoriety and inspiring copycat attacks. This individual, his actions, and his manifesto are one of the most referenced amongst Terrorgram and is a cornerstone of the ‘Saints’ culture propaganda tool used by Terrorgram. * 3 August 2019 – A 21-year-old individual killed 23 people in a Walmart in El Paso Texas. The shooter left a manifesto online, in which he listed the Christchurch shooter as his primary inspiration. The individual was also declared a ‘Saint’ by Terrorgram. * 14 May 2022 – An individual, directly inspired by the Christchurch shooter, shot and killed 10 African American individuals in a supermarket in Buffalo, New York, and was subsequently proclaimed a ‘Saint’ by Terrorgram. The shooter livestreamed a portion of his attack and released a manifesto explaining his motivation, which appropriated exact language from the Christchurch shooters manifestos that calls to future violent or accelerationist action. |
| **Other considerations**  **Links to Australia and threats to Australian interests**  Due to its online and decentralised nature, Terrorgram is easily accessible for Australians. With an international and primarily English-language speaking user base, it is possible there are Australian Terrorgram members.  On 26 June 2024, an Australian teenager attempted to livestream a terrorist attack on electoral offices in Newcastle. The individual released a manifesto along with his livestream, within which he directly attributed his radicalisation to Telegram and reviewing manifestos, and cited the 2019 Christchurch shooter (proclaimed a ‘Saint’ by Terrorgram). While the attack is not directly attributed to Terrorgram, Terrorgram used the failed attack to promote advice and instructions for how prospective future attackers could avoid the same failures and succeed in carrying out lone-actor terrorist attacks.  Following the failure of the June 2024 Newcastle attack, users in several neo-Nazi chats associated with Terrorgram forwarded a detailed plan providing advice for future lone-actor attackers, emphasising the importance of “mental preparation” when planning an attack to ensure that individuals planning their own attacks do not ‘fail’ in the same way.  **Listings by likeminded countries or the United Nations**  On 26 April 2024, the UK Government listed the Terrorgram collective as a terrorist organisation. The UK Minister for Security cited Terrorgram’s production of three magazine-style publications and a 24-minute documentary video for propaganda purposes as a contributing factor to its listing.  On 13 January 2025, the US Government listed The Terrorgram Collective as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, as well as three of its leaders. The three designated leaders are Ciro Daniel Amorim Ferreira, Noah Licul and Hendrik-Wahl Muller. In support of its listing of The Terrorgram Collective, the US cited the 2022 shooting outside of an LGBTQ+ bar in Slovakia, the July 2024 planned attack on energy facilities in New Jersey, and an August 2024 knife attack at a mosque in Türkiye. |
| **Conclusion**  On the basis of the information above, the Australian Government assesses that the organisation known as Terrorgram advocates the doing of a terrorist act. |

1. ‘Saints Culture’ or ‘sanctification’ is the revering of individuals who have committed extreme acts of hate-motivated violence. Internet and social media platforms are able to amplify ‘Saints Culture’ through the dissemination of manifestos, memes and livestream videos linked to attacks and celebration of anniversaries of those attacks. Portraying perpetrators and acts of extreme violence in a culture of deification, encourages further attacks, by glorifying and praising terrorist acts by individuals, who are portrayed as ‘Saints. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)