In considering whether a financial product has resulted, will result or is likely to result in significant consumer detriment, ASIC must take into account the nature and extent of the detriment, including the actual or potential financial loss to consumers resulting from the product: paragraph 1023E(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. Short term lending model ASIC considers the short term lending model results in significant detriment. The short term lending model involves two services or products provided to a retail client: · provision of short term credit (short term credit facility) by the short term credit provider, who charges fees consistent with limits prescribed in the short term credit exemption in subsection 6(1) of the National Credit Code (the short term credit exemption); and · an associate of the short term credit provider, providing collateral services (such as application, management and collection services) in relation to the provision of the short term credit, and who charges significant fees or other charges under a separate collateral contract. ASIC considers the short term lending model results in significant detriment because of the combination of the following factors: · the target market includes vulnerable consumers who are in financial difficulty and require short term loans generally to cover basic living expenses, many of whom have been declined for regulated credit; · the short term nature of the loans provides consumers with limited time to raise funds to make the required repayments; · the overall fees and charges charged under the model are significantly higher than what is permitted under the short term credit exemption; · the short term lending model has a high default rate, which results in large amounts of default related fees being charged to consumers; and · many consumers cannot afford to repay the short term loans or repay them without suffering substantial hardship. ASIC has taken into account the nature and extent of the significant detriment, comprising financial loss and non-financial detriment. Financial loss ASIC has identified the following financial losses as resulting from the short term lending model: · Consumers are being charged significant upfront, ongoing and default fees under the short term lending model, in excess of what is permitted under the short term credit exemption. · Additional fees from third parties are often incurred, including bank charges in relation to dishonoured direct debits and overdrawn fees. · As a result of the significant fees and charges and subsequent increase in debt, consumers are often unable to meet other financial commitments. As the short term credit facilities provided under the short term lending model are not regulated ‘small amount credit contracts’, consumers do not have the following statutory protections under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (National Credit Act) and National Credit Code: · not to be charged more fees and costs than credit providers can charge if the contract was a small amount credit contract (being an establishment fee of up to 20% of the credit amount, and a monthly fee of up to 4% of the credit amount); · not to be charged an establishment fee if they refinance; and · not to be obliged to repay more than double the amount borrowed in the event of default. Significant fees The following table illustrates the type of fees that have been charged under the short term lending model. Fee | Amount | Short term credit provider fees | | Lender fee | 5% of the loan amount | Associate fees | | Financial supply fee | Between 35% - 115% of loan amount (see note) | Priority/same day deposit fee | $16 | Account keeping fee | $5.95 per week | Dishonour payment fee | $49 | First dishonoured letter fee | $30 | Second dishonoured letter fee | $50 | Third dishonoured letter fee | $50 | Change of payment date/amount fee | $20 | Payment reschedule fee | $30 | Collections phone contact fee | $8.80 | Collections tracking fee | $50 | Investigator/hand over fee | $175 (plus legal fees) | Source: Cigno’s website as at 28 June 2019 Note: The Financial supply fee is based on the payment option that the consumer selects. Cigno offers six different payment options with a different financial supply fee for each option. For example, one payment option has a financial supply fee of 35% of the loan amount, and the eight payment option has a financial supply fee of 115% of the loan amount. The six and eight payment options are only offered to existing customers. From a review of these fees and additional confidential data received, ASIC understands that: · The lender fee, 5% of the loan amount, is the only fee charged by the short term credit provider under the short term credit facility. This amounts to approximately 2% of the overall fees charged under this short term lending model. · The remaining fees are charged by the short term credit provider’s associate under a separate collateral contract. This amounts to approximately 98% of the overall fees charged under this short term lending model. · These fees charged by the associate under a collateral contract, comprising 98% of the overall fees charged under the short term lending model, exceed the fees that can be charged under the short term credit exemption. · The short term lending model has a high default rate, which is almost double the default rate of similar regulated credit products, such as small amount credit contracts. · Approximately 60% of the associate’s total revenue earnt through the short term lending model was attributable to default related fees as a result of missed payments. · Approximately 30% of the associate’s total revenue earnt through the short term lending model was attributable to the financial supply fees. · ASIC estimates that at least 270,000 consumers have obtained credit through the short term lending model from May 2016 to April 2019. Case Studies In CP 316, ASIC provided three case studies of consumers who had suffered significant detriment caused by the short term lending model. For example, see Case study 1, which highlights the impact of default fees from paragraph 5 of CP 316: Case study 1: Impact of default fees Consumer A was on a Centrelink Newstart allowance when she obtained short term credit through Cigno for $120. Under the contract: o Cigno charged a $90 financial supply fee; o Cigno charged $5.95 in weekly account keeping fees; o GSSF charged a credit fee of $6; and o the total amount to be repaid was $263.60, by four fortnightly payments of $66 (with the fourth payment being $65.60). Consumer A could not afford the repayments and immediately defaulted. She was charged various dishonour fees and ongoing weekly account-keeping fees. As a result, Consumer A became liable to repay $1,189 on the original amount of $120 (or 990% more than she borrowed). By comparison, if Consumer A had entered into a small amount credit contract regulated by the National Credit Act, she could have been charged a maximum total fee of $33.60 comprising: o an establishment fee of up to 20% of the amount of credit ($24); and o a monthly fee of up to 4% of the amount of credit for four fortnights ($9.60). The total amount repayable under the contract would have been $153.60 compared to $263.60 with the Cigno product. If Consumer A had entered into an exempt short term credit facility, she could have paid a maximum of $130.64 comprising: o the initial amount of $120; o a 5% fee on this amount ($6); and o 24% p.a. interest for 56 days ($4.64). This case study demonstrates how default fees arising from missed payments can make an initially small loan become almost 10 times the original loan amount. In response to CP 316, aggrieved consumers, financial counselling and community legal centres provided over 100 consumer case studies to support their submissions, which highlighted common themes of: · charging of excessive fees; · consumers’ lack of understanding of the fees/charges; · irresponsible lending with no adequate affordability assessments resulting in high levels of default related fees; · targeting and exploitation of vulnerable consumers, in particular Indigenous consumers; and · high prevalence of direct debits from consumers’ accounts leaving insufficient funds to pay for basic living expenses. ASIC has observed similar themes arising out of reports of misconduct received by ASIC in relation to the short term lending model. Reports of Misconduct · From 1 July 2016 to 31 August 2019 ASIC received 209 reports of misconduct against Cigno Pty Ltd (Cigno), one user of the short term lending model. This is the largest number of reports of misconduct made to ASIC across all entities of complaints relating to short term credit, payday and personal loans. · These complaints have raised similar themes that were raised by the case studies discussed above, with the majority of complaints (86%) regarding excessive fees, charges and interest rates. Non-financial detriment As the contracts provided under the short term lending model are not regulated ‘small amount credit contracts’, consumers do not have the various consumer protections under the National Credit Act and the National Credit Code, including: · to have a proper responsible lending assessment by the credit provider about whether the credit amount is affordable and meets their requirements and objectives; · for Centrelink recipients who receive at least 50% of their gross income as payments under the Social Security Act 1991, to ensure that repayments do not exceed 20% of their gross income for that payment cycle; · to insist that credit providers have IDR processes and are a member of an EDR scheme, which would make it possible for them to complain (free of charge) to the EDR scheme in the event of a dispute; · to apply for hardship and be given the relevant protections under section 72 of the National Credit Code; · to be provided with a warning statement before they enter the contract, which explains and outlines the costs payable and alternatives available to them; and · to rely on the various other protections and provisions of the National Credit Act and Code (e.g. the rebuttable presumption that if they were in default under a regulated small amount credit contract or had two or more such contracts at the time of a preliminary assessment, they could only comply with their financial obligations under the relevant contract with substantial hardship). Consumers have also been reported to suffer physical and mental hardship due to the financial stress, distress and anxiety caused by the short term lending model. These impacts are discussed in the section below. Further details of the significant detriment caused by the short term lending model is set out in CP 316 at paragraphs 35 to 67. |